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Abstract—We consider a problem where mutually untrusting
curators possess portions of a vertically partitioned database
containing information about a set of individuals. The goal is
to enable an authorized party to obtain aggregate (statistical)
information from the database while protecting the privacy of the
individuals, which we formalize using Differential Privacy. This
process can be facilitated by an untrusted server that provides
storage and processing services but should not learn anything
about the database. This work describes a data release mech-
anism that employs Post Randomization (PRAM), encryption
and random sampling to maintain privacy, while allowing the
authorized party to conduct an accurate statistical analysis of
the data. Encryption ensures that the storage server obtains
no information about the database, while PRAM and sampling
ensures individual privacy is maintained against the authorized
party. We characterize how much the composition of random
sampling with PRAM increases the differential privacy of system
compared to using PRAM alone. We also analyze the statistical
utility of our system, by bounding the estimation error — the
expected `2-norm error between the true empirical distribution
and the estimated distribution — as a function of the number
of samples, PRAM noise, and other system parameters. Our
analysis shows a tradeoff between increasing PRAM noise versus
decreasing the number of samples to maintain a desired level of
privacy, and we determine the optimal number of samples that
balances this tradeoff and maximizes the utility. In experimental
simulations with the UCI “Adult Data Set” and with synthetically
generated data, we confirm that the theoretically predicted
optimal number of samples indeed achieves close to the minimal
empirical error, and that our analytical error bounds match well
with the empirical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most visible technological trends is the emer-
gence and proliferation of large-scale data collection. Public
and private enterprises are collecting tremendous volumes of
data on individuals, their activities, their preferences, their
locations, their medical histories, and so on. These enter-
prises include government organizations, healthcare providers,
financial institutions, internet search engines, social networks,
cloud service providers, and many other kinds of private
companies. Naturally, interested parties could potentially dis-
cern meaningful patterns and gain valuable insights if they
were able to access and correlate the information across these
large, distributed databases. For example, a social scientist
may want to determine the correlations between individual
income with personal characteristics such as gender, race, age,
education, etc., or a medical researcher may want to study
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Fig. 1. An example in which curators Alice and Bob hold vertically
partitioned data, and a sanitized combination of their databases is made
available for statistical analysis.
the relationships between disease prevalence and individual
environmental factors. In such applications, it is imperative to
maintain the privacy of individuals, while ensuring that the
useful aggregate (statistical) information is only revealed to
the authorized parties. Indeed, unless the public is satisfied
that their privacy is being preserved, they would not provide
their consent for the collection and use of their personal
information. Additionally, the inherent distribution of this
data across multiple curators present a significant challenge,
as privacy concerns and policy would likely prevent these
curators from directly sharing their data to facilitate statistical
analysis in a centralized fashion. Thus, tools must be devel-
oped for conducting statistical analysis on large and distributed
databases, while addressing these privacy and policy concerns.
As an example, consider two curators Alice and Bob,
who possess two databases containing census-type information
about individuals in a population, as shown in Figure 1.
Suppose that this data is to be combined and made available
to authorized researchers studying salaries in the population,
while ensuring that the privacy of the individual respondents is
maintained. Conceptually, a data release mechanism involves
the “sanitization” of the data (via some form of perturbation
or transform) to preserve individual privacy, before making
it available for data analysis. The suitability of the method
used to sanitize the data is determined by the extent to which
rigorously defined privacy constraints are met.
Recent research has shown that conventional mechanisms
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2for privacy, such as k-anonymization [1], [2] do not provide
adequate privacy. Specifically, an informed adversary can link
an arbitrary amount of side information to the anonymized
database, and defeat the anonymization mechanism [3]. In
response to vulnerabilities of simple anonymization mecha-
nisms, a stricter notion of privacy — Differential Privacy [4],
[5] — has been developed in recent years. Informally, differ-
ential privacy ensures that the result of a function computed on
a database of respondents is almost insensitive to the presence
or absence of a particular respondent. A more formal way of
stating this is that when the function is evaluated on adjacent
databases (differing in only one respondent), the probability
of outputting the same result is almost unchanged.
Mechanisms that provide differential privacy typically in-
volve output perturbation, e.g., when Laplacian noise is added
to the result of a function computed on a database, it pro-
vides differential privacy to the individual respondents in the
database [6], [7]. Nevertheless, it can be shown that input
perturbation approaches such as the randomized response
mechanism [8], [9] – where noise is added to the data
itself – also provide differential privacy to the respondents.
In this work, we are interested in a privacy mechanism
that achieves three goals. Firstly, the mechanism protects the
privacy of individual respondents in a database. We achieve
this through a privacy mechanism involving sampling and
Post Randomization (PRAM) [10], which is a generalization
of randomized response. Secondly, the mechanism prevents
unauthorized parties from learning anything about the data. We
achieve this using random pads which can only be reversed
by the authorized parties. Thirdly, the mechanism achieves
a superior tradeoff between privacy and utility compared to
simply performing PRAM on the database. We show that
sampling the database enhances privacy with respect to the
individual respondents while retaining the utility provided to
an authorized researcher interested in the joint and marginal
empirical probability distributions.
The idea of enhancing differential privacy via sampling,
to the best of our knowledge, first appeared in [6], [11] and
was further developed by [12]. Theorem 3.2 that we develop
and prove herein is analogous to the privacy amplification
result of Theorem 1 in [12], however, the theorems are proved
differently. Specifically, our proof requires an extra and non-
trivial step because of the fact that the definition of differential
privacy and sampling method in our setting are different. In
the definition of differential privacy used in [6], [11], [12],
neighboring or adjacent databases are obtained by adding or
deleting an entry from the database under consideration. This
notion of adjacency cannot be used in our setting owing the
fact that our setting involves perturbing the input data directly
using techniques such as PRAM. In our work, an adjacent
or neighboring database is obtained by replacing (i.e. deleting
and adding) a single entry to the database under consideration.
Further, the work in [6], [11], [12] uses sampling with a
fixed probability of including or excluding a sample, while
our sampling mechanism is slightly different: the number of
samples is fixed, and then sampling is carried out uniformly
and without replacement based on the ratio of the number
of samples to the size of the original database. This requires
a different proof technique that considers sets of possible
samplings.
The more significant difference with respect to recent work
is that, unlike [12], we conduct a utility analysis, and derive
a bound on the accuracy with which the desired statistical
measures can be estimated, as a function of the noise inserted
for privacy and the number of samples. Our analysis reveals a
privacy-utility tradeoff between increasing PRAM noise versus
decreasing the number of samples to maintain a desired level
of differential privacy, and we determine the optimal number
of samples that balances this tradeoff and maximizes the
utility. We carry out experiments on both real-world and syn-
thetically generated data which confirm the existence of this
tradeoff, and reveal that the experimentally obtained optimal
number of samples is very close to the number predicted by
our analysis.
Another related work examines the effect of sampling on
crowd-blending privacy [13]. This is a strictly relaxed version
of differential privacy, but it is shown that a pre-sampling step
applied to a crowd-blending privacy mechanism can achieve
a desired amount of differential privacy. The scenario in our
work differs from the treatment in [13] in that we consider
vertically partitioned distributed databases which are held by
mutually untrusting curators. In our setting, computing joint
statistics requires a join operation on the databases, which
implies that individual curators cannot independently blend
their respondents without altering the joint statistics across all
databases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II describes the multiparty problem setting, fixes
notation and gives the privacy and utility definitions used
in our analysis. Section III contains our main development,
and begins by describing the mechanism itself, consisting of
encryption via random padding, randomized sampling, and
data perturbation. It is shown that sampling enhances the
privacy of the individual respondents. An expression is derived
for the utility function, namely the expected `2-norm error in
the estimate of the joint distribution, in terms of the number of
samples and the amount of noise introduced by PRAM. More
importantly, the analysis reveals a tradeoff between the number
of samples and the perturbation noise. We conclude the section
by deriving an expression for the optimal number of samples
needed to maximize the utility function while achieving a
desired level of privacy. In Section IV, the claims made in
the theoretical analysis are tested experimentally with the UCI
“Adult Data Set” [14] and with synthetically generated data.
In particular, the theoretically predicted optimal number of
samples, that minimizes the error in the joint distribution, is
found to agree closely with the experimental results. Finally,
Section V summarizes the main results and concludes the pa-
per with a discussion on the practical considerations involved
in performing privacy-preserving statistical analysis using a
combination of encryption, sampling and data perturbation.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present our general problem setup,
wherein database curators wish to release data to enable
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Fig. 2. Curators Alice and Bob independently encrypt their databases and
provide it to a cloud server. The cloud server will sanitize the joint data. A
researcher with decryption key can derive joint statistics or joint type based on
the sanitized data, without compromising the privacy of individual database
respondents. Neither the statistics nor the individual data entries are revealed
to the cloud server.
privacy-preserving data analysis by an authorized party. For
ease of exposition, we present our problem formulation and
results with two data curators, Alice and Bob, however our
methods can easily be generalized to more than two curators.
Consider a data mining application in which Alice and Bob
are mutually untrusting data curators, as shown in Figure 2.
The two databases are to be made available for research with
authorization granted by the data curators, such that statistical
measures can be computed either on the individual databases,
or on some combination of the two databases. Data curators
should have flexible access control over the data. For example,
if a researcher is granted access by Alice but not by Bob,
then he/she can only access Alice’s data. In addition, the
cloud server should only host the data and not be able access
the information. The data should be sanitized, before being
released, to protect individual privacy. Altogether, we have
the following privacy and utility requirements:
1) Database Security: Only researchers authorized by the
data curators should be able to extract statistical informa-
tion from the database.
2) Respondent Privacy: Individual privacy of the respon-
dents must be maintained against the cloud server as well
as the researchers.
3) Statistical Utility: An authorized researcher, i.e., one
possessing appropriate keys, should be able to compute
the joint and marginal distributions of the data provided
by Alice and Bob.
4) Complexity: The overall communication and computa-
tion requirements of the system should be reasonable.
In the following sections, we will present our system
framework and formalize the notions of privacy and utility.
A. Type and Matrix Notation
The type (or empirical distribution) of a sequence Xn is
defined as the mapping TXn : X → [0, 1] given by
∀x ∈ X , TXn(x) := |{i : Xi = x}|
n
.
The joint type of two sequences Xn and Y n is defined as the
mapping TXn,Y n : X × Y → [0, 1] given by
∀(x, y) ∈ X×Y, TXn,Y n(x, y) := |{i : (Xi, Yi) = (x, y)}|
n
.
For notational convenience, when working with finite-
domain type/distribution functions, we will drop the arguments
to represent and use these functions as vectors/matrices. For
example, we can represent a distribution function PX : X →
[0, 1] as the |X | × 1 column-vector PX , with its values
arranged according to a fixed consistent ordering of X . Thus,
with a slight abuse of notation, using the values of X to
index the vector, the “x”-th element of the vector, PX [x], is
given by PX(x). Similarly, a conditional distribution function
PY |X : Y×X → [0, 1] can be represented as a |Y|×|X | matrix
PY |X , defined by PY |X [y, x] := PY |X(y|x). For example, by
utilizing this notation, the elementary probability identity
∀y ∈ Y, PY (y) =
∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)PX(x),
can be written in matrix form as simply PY = PY |XPX .
B. System Framework
Database Model: The data table held by Alice is modeled
as a sequence Xn := (X1, X2, . . . , Xn), with each Xi
taking values in the finite-alphabet X . Likewise, Bob’s data
table is modeled as a sequence of random variables Y n :=
(Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn), with each Yi taking values in the finite-
alphabet Y . The length of the sequences, n, represents the
total number of respondents in the database, and each (Xi, Yi)
pair represents the data of the respondent i collectively held
by Alice and Bob, with the alphabet X × Y representing the
domain of each respondent’s data.
Data Processing and Release: The curators each apply
a data release mechanism to their respective data tables to
produce an encryption of their data for the cloud server
and a decryption key to be relayed to the researcher. These
mechanisms are denoted by the randomized mappings FA :
Xn → OA × KA and FB : Yn → OB × KB , where KA
and KB are suitable key spaces, and OB and OA are suitable
encryption spaces. The encryptions and keys are produced and
given by
(OA,KA) := FA(X
n),
(OB ,KB) := FB(Y
n).
The encryptions OA and OB are sent to the cloud server,
which performs processing, and the keys KA and KB are
later sent to the researcher. The cloud server processes OA
and OB , producing an output O via a random mapping M :
OA ×OB → O, as given by
O := M(OA, OB).
Statistical Recovery: To enable the recovery of the statis-
tics of the database, the processed output O is provided to the
researcher via the cloud server, and the encryption keys KA
and KB are provided by the curators. The researcher produces
an estimate of the joint type (empirical distribution) of Alice
4and Bob’s sequences, denoted by T̂Xn,Y n , as a function of O,
KA, and KB , as given by
T̂Xn,Y n := g(O,KA,KB),
where g : O × KA × KB → [0, 1]X×Y is the reconstruction
function.
The objective is to design a system within the above
framework, by specifying the mappings FA, FB , M , and g,
that optimize the system performance requirements, which are
formulated in the next subsection.
C. Privacy and Utility Conditions
In this subsection, we formulate the privacy and utility
requirements for our problem framework.
Privacy against the Server: In the course of system
operation, the data curators do not want reveal any information
about their data tables (not even aggregate statistics) to the
cloud server. A strong statistical condition that guarantees
this security is the requirement of statistical independence
between the data tables and the encrypted versions held by the
server. The statistical requirement of independence guarantees
security even against an adversarial server with unbounded
resources, and does not require any unproved assumptions.
Respondent Privacy: The data pertaining to a respondent
should be kept private from all other parties, including any
authorized researchers who aim to recover the statistics. We
formalize this notion using -differential privacy for the re-
spondents as follows:
Definition 2.1: [15] Given the above framework, the sys-
tem provides -differential privacy if for all databases
(xn, yn) and (x˙n, y˙n) in Xn×Yn, within Hamming distance
dH((x
n, yn), (x˙n, y˙n)) ≤ 1, and all S ⊆ O ×KA ×KB ,
Pr
[
(O,KA,KB) ∈ S
∣∣(Xn, Y n) = (xn, yn)]
≤ e Pr [(O,KA,KB) ∈ S∣∣(Xn, Y n) = (x˙n, y˙n)]
This rigorous definition of privacy is widely used and sat-
isfies the privacy axioms of [16], [17]. Under the assumption
that the respondents’ data is i.i.d., this definition results in a
strong privacy guarantee: an attacker with knowledge of all
except one of the respondents cannot recover the data of the
sole missing respondent [18].
Utility for Authorized Researchers: The utility of the
estimate is measured by the expected `2-norm error of this
estimated type vector, given by
E
∥∥T̂Xn,Y n − TXn,Y n∥∥2
:=
√ ∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
∣∣T̂Xn,Y n(x, y)− TXn,Y n(x, y)∣∣2,
with the goal being the minimization of this error.
System Complexity: The communication and computa-
tional complexity of the system are also of concern. The
computational complexity can be captured by the complexity
of implementing the mappings (FA, FB , M and g) that specify
a given system. Ideally, one should aim to minimize the com-
putational complexity of all of these mappings, simplifying the
operations that each party must perform. The communication
requirements is given by the cardinalities of the symbol
alphabets (OA, OB , KA, KB , and O). The logarithms of these
alphabet sizes indicate the sufficient length for the messages
that must be transmitted in this system.
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we will present the details of our system,
and analyze its privacy and utility performance. First, in Sec-
tion III-A, we will describe how our system utilizes sampling
and additive encryption, enabling a cloud server to join and
perturb encrypted data in order to facilitate the release of
sanitized data to the researcher. Next, in Section III-B, we
analyze the privacy of our system and show that sampling
enhances privacy, thereby reducing the amount of noise that
must be injected during the perturbation step in order to obtain
a desired level of privacy. Finally, in Section III-C, we analyze
the accuracy of the joint type reconstruction, producing a
bound on the utility as a function of the system parameters,
viz., the noise added during perturbation, and the sampling
factor.
A. System Architecture
The data sanitization and release procedure is outlined by
the following steps:
1) Sampling: The curators randomly sample their data,
producing shortened sequences.
2) Encryption: The curators encrypt and send these short-
ened sequences to the cloud server.
3) Perturbation: The cloud server combines and perturbs
the encrypted sequences.
4) Release: The researcher obtains the sanitized data from
the server and the encryption keys from the curators,
allowing the approximate recovery of data statistics.
A key aspect of these steps is that the encryption and perturba-
tion schemes are designed such that these operations commute,
thus allowing the server to essentially perform perturbation
on the encrypted sequences, and for the authorized researcher
to subsequently decrypt perturbed data. In this section, we
describe the details of each step from a theoretical perspective
by applying mathematical abstractions and assumptions. Later
on, we will discuss practical implementations towards the
realizing this system. The overall data sanitization process is
illustrated in Figure 3.
Sampling: The data curators reduce their length-n database
sequences (Xn, Y n) to m randomly drawn samples. We as-
sume that these samples are drawn uniformly without replace-
ment and that the curators will both sample at the same lo-
cations. We will let (X˜m, Y˜ m) := (X˜1, . . . , X˜m, Y˜1, . . . , Y˜m)
denote the intermediate result after sampling. Mathematically,
the sampling result is described by, for all i in {1, . . . ,m},
(X˜i, Y˜i) = (XIi , YIi),
where I1, . . . , Im are drawn uniformly without replacement
from {1, . . . , n}.
Encryption: The data curators independently encrypt their
sampled data sequences with an additive (one-time pad)
encryption scheme. To encrypt her data, Alice chooses an
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Fig. 3. Curators Alice and Bob independently encrypt their databases with a
one time pad and provide it to a cloud server. The server samples m respon-
dents and then performs PRAM to guarantee privacy of the individual database
respondents. A researcher can derive joint statistics or joint type based on the
sanitized data, without compromising the privacy of the respondents. Neither
the statistics nor the individual data entries are revealed to the cloud server.
independent uniform key sequence V m ∈ Xm, and produces
the encrypted sequence
Xˇm := X˜m ⊕ V m := (X˜1 + V1, . . . , X˜m + Vm),
where ⊕ denotes addition1 applied element-by-element over
the sequences. Similarly, Bob encrypts his data, with the
independent uniform key sequence Wm ∈ Ym, to produce
the encrypted sequence
Yˇ m := Y˜ m ⊕Wm := (Y˜1 +W1, . . . , Y˜m +Wm).
Alice and Bob send these encrypted sequences to the cloud
server, and will provide the keys to the researcher to enable
data release.
Perturbation: The cloud server joins the encrypted data
sequences, forming ((Xˇ1, Yˇ1), . . . , (Xˇm, Yˇm)), and perturbs
them by applying an independent PRAM mechanism, pro-
ducing the perturbed results (X
m
, Y
m
). Each joined and
encrypted sample, (Xˇi, Yˇi), is perturbed independently and
identically according to a conditional distribution, PX,Y |Xˇ,Yˇ ,
that specifies a random mapping from (X × Y) to (X × Y).
Using the matrix A := PX,Y |Xˇ,Yˇ to represent the conditional
distribution, this operation can be described by
PXm,Ym|Xˇm,Yˇm(x
m, xm|xˇm, xˇm) =
m∏
i=1
A[(xi, yi), (xˇi, yˇi)].
By design, we specify that A is a γ-diagonal matrix, for a
parameter γ > 1, given by
A[(x, y), (xˇ, yˇ)] :=
{
γ/q, if (x, y) = (xˇ, yˇ),
1/q, o.w.,
where q := (γ + |X ||Y| − 1) is a normalizing constant.
Release: In order to recover the data statistics, the re-
searcher obtains the sampled, encrypted, and perturbed data
1The addition operation can be any suitably defined group addition opera-
tion over the finite set X .
sequences, (X
m
, Y
m
), from the cloud server, and the encryp-
tion keys, V m and Wm, from the curators. The researcher
decrypts and recovers the sanitized data given by
(X̂m, Ŷ m) := (X
m ⊕ V m, Y m ⊕Wm),
which is effectively the data sanitized by sampling and PRAM
(see Lemma 3.1 below). The researcher produces the joint type
estimate by inverting the matrix A and multiplying it with the
joint type of the sanitized data as follows
T̂Xn,Y n := A
−1TX̂m,Ŷm .
Due to the γ-diagonal property of A, the PRAM perturba-
tion is essentially an additive operation that commutes with
the additive encryption. This allows the server to perturb the
encrypted data, with the perturbation being preserved when the
encryption is removed. The following Lemma summarizes this
property, by stating that the decrypted, sanitized data recovered
by the researcher, (X̂m, Ŷ m), is essentially the sampled data
perturbed by PRAM.
Lemma 3.1: Given the system described above, we have
that
PX̂m,Ŷm|X˜m,Y˜m(x̂
m, ŷm|x˜m, y˜m) =
m∏
i=1
A[(x̂i, ŷi), (x˜i, y˜i)].
B. Sampling Enhances Privacy
In this subsection, we will analyze the privacy of our
proposed system. Specifically, we show how sampling in
conjunction with PRAM enhances the overall privacy for the
respondents in comparison to using PRAM alone. Note that if
PRAM, with the γ-diagonal matrix A, was applied alone to the
full databases, the resulting perturbed data would have ln(γ)-
differential privacy. In the following lemma, we will show that
the combination of sampling and PRAM results in sampled
and perturbed data with enhanced privacy.
Theorem 3.2: The proposed system provides -differential
privacy for the respondents, where
 = ln
(
n+m(γ − 1)
n
)
. (1)
Proof: The researcher receives the perturbed and en-
crypted data from the server O := (X
m
, Y
m
) and the keys
(KA,KB) := (V
m,Wm) from the curators. However, since
the sanitized data, (X̂m, Ŷ m), recovered by the researcher
is a sufficient statistic for the original databases, that is, the
following Markov chain holds
(Xn, Y n)− (X̂m, Ŷ m)− (Xm, Y m, V m,Wm),
we need only to show that, for all (xn, yn), (x˙n, y˙n), and
(x̂m, ŷm) in Xn × Yn with dH((xn, yn), (x˙n, y˙n)) = 1,
PX̂m,Ŷm|Xn,Y n(x̂
m, ŷm|xn, yn)
PX̂m,Ŷm|Xn,Y n(x̂
m, ŷm|x˙n, y˙n) ≤ e
,
in order to prove -differential privacy for the respondents.
Since dH((xn, yn), (x˙n, y˙n)) = 1, the two database differ in
only one location. Let k denote the location where (xk, yk) 6=
(x˙k, y˙k).
6Before we proceed, we introduce some notation regarding
sampling to facilitate the steps of our proof. We will use the
following notation for the set of all possible samplings
Θ :=
{
pi|pi := (pi1, . . . , pim) ∈ {1, . . . , n}m, pii 6= pij ,∀i 6= j
}
.
The sampling locations (I1, . . . , Im) are uniformly drawn from
the set Θ. We also define Θk := {pi ∈ Θ | ∃ i, pii = k}
to denote the subset of samplings that select location k,
and Θck := Θ \ Θk to denote the subset of samplings
that do not select location k. For pi ∈ Θk, we define
Θk(pi) := {pi′ ∈ Θck|dH(pi, pi′) = 1} as the subset of Θck
that replaces the selection of location k with any other non-
selected location. We will also slightly abuse notation by using
pi ∈ Θ as sampling function for the database sequences, that is,
pi(Xn) := (Xpi1 , . . . , Xpim), and similarly for pi(Y
n). Using
the above notation, we can rewrite the following conditional
probability,
PX̂m,Ŷm|Xn,Y n(x̂
m, ŷm|xn, yn)
=
∑
pi∈Θ
1
|Θ|PX̂m,Ŷm|X˜m,Y˜m
(
x̂m, ŷm|pi(xn), pi(yn))
=
1
|Θ|
[ ∑
pi∈Θk
PX̂m,Ŷm|X˜m,Y˜m
(
x̂m, ŷm|pi(xn), pi(yn))
+
∑
pi′∈Θck
PX̂m,Ŷm|X˜m,Y˜m
(
x̂m, ŷm|pi′(xn), pi′(yn))]
=
1
|Θ|
[ ∑
pi∈Θk
(
PX̂m,Ŷm|X˜m,Y˜m
(
x̂m, ŷm|pi(xn), pi(yn))
+
1
m
∑
pi′∈Θk(pi)
PX̂m,Ŷm|X˜m,Y˜m
(
x̂m, ŷm|pi′(xn), pi′(yn)))],
where in the last equality we have rearranged the summations
to embed the summation over pi′ ∈ Θck into the summation
over pi ∈ Θk. Note that summing over all pi′ ∈ Θk(pi) within a
summation over all pi ∈ Θk covers all pi′ ∈ Θck, but overcounts
each pi′ exactly m times since each pi′ ∈ Θck belongs to m of
the Θk(pi) sets across all pi ∈ Θk. Hence, a (1/m) term has
been added to account for this overcount.
To ease the use of the above expansion, we introduce the
following shorthand notation for the summation terms,
α(pi) := PX̂m,Ŷm|X˜m,Y˜m
(
x̂m, ŷm|pi(xn), pi(yn))
β(pi) := PX̂m,Ŷm|X˜m,Y˜m
(
x̂m, ŷm|pi(x˙n), pi(y˙n)).
Thus, the following probability ratio can be written as
PX̂m,Ŷm|Xn,Y n(x̂
m, ŷm|xn, yn)
PX̂m,Ŷm|Xn,Y n(x̂
m, ŷm|x˙n, y˙n)
=
∑
pi∈Θk
(
α(pi) + 1m
∑
pi′∈Θk(pi) α(pi
′)
)∑
pi∈Θk
(
β(pi) + 1m
∑
pi′∈Θk(pi) β(pi
′)
)
≤ max
pi∈Θk
α(pi) + 1m
∑
pi′∈Θk(pi) α(pi
′)
β(pi) + 1m
∑
pi′∈Θk(pi) β(pi
′)
=
α(pi∗) + 1m
∑
pi′∈Θk(pi∗) α(pi
′)
β(pi∗) + 1m
∑
pi′∈Θk(pi∗) β(pi
′)
,
where pi∗ ∈ Θk denotes the sampling that maximizes the ratio.
Given the γ-diagonal structure of the matrix A, we have that
γ−1α(pi∗) ≤ β(pi∗),
since (pi∗(xn), pi∗(yn)) and (pi∗(x˙n), pi∗(y˙n)) differ in only
one location,
γ−1α(pi∗) ≤ α(pi′), ∀pi′ ∈ Θk(pi∗),
since (pi∗(xn), pi∗(yn)) and (pi′(xn), pi′(yn)) differ in only one
location, and
α(pi′) = β(pi′), ∀pi′ ∈ Θk(pi∗),
since (pi′(xn), pi′(yn)) = (pi′(x˙n), pi′(y˙n)). Given these con-
straints, we can continue to bound the likelihood ratio as
PX̂m,Ŷm|Xn,Y n(x̂
m, ŷm|xn, yn)
PX̂m,Ŷm|Xn,Y n(x̂
m, ŷm|x˙n, y˙n)
≤ α(pi
∗) + 1m
∑
pi′∈Θk(pi∗) α(pi
′)
β(pi∗) + 1m
∑
pi′∈Θk(pi∗) β(pi
′)
≤ α(pi
∗) + n−mm γ
−1α(pi∗)
γ−1α(pi∗) + n−mm γ
−1α(pi∗)
=
n+m(γ − 1)
n
= e,
thus finishing the proof by bounding the likelihood ratio with
e.
To show -differential privacy for a given , we only need
to upperbound the probability ratio by e, as done in the above
proof. A natural question is if this bound is tight, that is,
whether there exists a smaller  for which the bound also holds,
hence making the system more private. With the following
example, we show that the value for  given in Theorem 3.2
is tight.
Example 3.3: Let a and b be two distinct elements in (X ×
Y). Let (xn, yn) = (b, a, a, . . . , a), (x˙n, y˙n) = (a, a, . . . , a)
and (x̂m, ŷm) = (b, b, . . . , b). Let E denote the event that
the first element (where the two databases differ) is sampled,
which occurs with probability (m/n). We can determine the
likelihood ratio as follows
PX̂m,Ŷm|Xn,Y n(x̂
m, ŷm|xn, yn)
PX̂m,Ŷm|Xn,Y n(x̂
m, ŷm|x˙n, y˙n)
=
Pr[E]γ(1/q)m + (1− Pr[E])(1/q)m
(1/q)m
=
n+m(γ − 1)
n
= e.
Thus, the value of  given by Theorem 3.2 is tight.
As a consequence of the privacy analysis of Theorem 3.2,
we have that for given system parameters of database length n,
number of samples m, and desired level privacy , the level
of PRAM perturbation, specified by the γ parameter of the
matrix A, must be
γ = 1 +
n
m
(e − 1). (2)
Privacy against the server is obtained as a consequence
of the one-time-pad encryption performed on the data prior
to transmission to the server. It is straightforward to verify
7that the encryptions received by the server are statistically
independent of the original database as a consequence of the
independence and uniform randomness of the keys.
C. Utility Analysis
In this subsection, we will analyze the utility of our pro-
posed system. Our main result is a theoretical bound on the
expected `2-norm of the joint type estimation error. Analysis
of this bound will illustrate the tradeoffs between utility and
privacy level  as function of sampling parameter m and
PRAM perturbation level γ. Given this error bound, we can
compute the optimal sampling parameter m for minimizing
the error bound while achieving a fixed privacy level .
Theorem 3.4: For our proposed system, the expected `2-
norm of the joint type estimate is bounded by
E
∥∥T̂Xn,Y n − TXn,Y n∥∥2 ≤ c
√|X ||Y|+ 1√
m
. (3)
where c is the condition number of the γ-diagonal matrix A,
given by
c = 1 +
|X ||Y|
γ − 1 .
Proof: The expected `2-norm error is given by
E
∥∥T̂Xn,Y n − TXn,Y n∥∥2 = E∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TXn,Y n∥∥2.
Applying the triangle inequality, we can bound the error as
the sum of the error introduced by sampling and the error
introduced by PRAM, as follows,
E
∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TXn,Y n∥∥2 ≤
E
∥∥TX˜m,Y˜m − TXn,Y n∥∥2 + E∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2.
We will analyze and bound the sampling error,
E
∥∥TX˜m,Y˜m − TXn,Y n∥∥2,
by utilizing the smoothing theorem by first bounding the
conditional expectation
E
[∥∥TX˜m,Y˜m − TXn,Y n∥∥2∣∣∣TXn,Y n] .
For a given (x, y) ∈ X ×Y , the sampled type, TX˜m,Y˜m(x, y),
conditioned on TXn,Y n , is a hypergeometric random variable
normalized by m, with expectation and variance given by
E
[
TX˜m,Y˜m(x, y)
∣∣TXn,Y n] = TXn,Y n(x, y),
Var
[
TX˜m,Y˜m(x, y)
∣∣TXn,Y n] =
nTXn,Y n(x, y)
(
n− nTXn,Y n(x, y)
)
(n−m)
mn2(n− 1)
≤ TXn,Y n(x, y)
m
.
Applying Jensen’s inequality to the conditioned sampling
error yields
E
[∥∥TX˜m,Y˜m − TXn,Y n∥∥2∣∣∣TXn,Y n]
≤
√ ∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
Var
[
TX˜m,Y˜m(x, y)
∣∣TXn,Y n] ≤ 1√
m
.
Applying the smoothing theorem, the sampling error can be
bounded by
E
∥∥TX˜m,Y˜m − TXn,Y n∥∥2 =
ETXn,Y n
[
E
[∥∥TX˜m,Y˜m − TXn,Y n∥∥2∣∣∣TXn,Y n]]
≤ 1√
m
.
Next, to analyze and bound the PRAM error given by
E
∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2,
we will make use of the following linear algebra lemma.
Lemma 3.5: Let A be an invertible matrix and (x, y) be
vectors that satisfy Ax = y. For any vectors (xˆ, yˆ) such that
xˆ = A−1yˆ, we have
‖xˆ− x‖
‖x‖ ≤ c
‖yˆ − y‖
‖y‖ ,
where c is the condition number of the matrix A.
To bound the PRAM error, we will make use of the
following consequence of this lemma,
∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2
≤ c ‖TX˜m,Y˜m‖2‖ATX˜m,Y˜m‖2
∥∥TX̂m,Ŷm −ATX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2,
which allows us to bound the conditional expectation of the
PRAM error as follows,
E
[∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2∣∣∣TX˜m,Y˜m]
≤ c ‖TX˜m,Y˜m‖2‖ATX˜m,Y˜m‖2
E
[∥∥TX̂m,Ŷm −ATX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2∣∣∣TX˜m,Y˜m] .
For a given (x, y) ∈ X × Y , the perturbed and sampled
type, TX̂m,Ŷm(x, y), conditioned on TX˜m,Y˜m , is a poisson-
binomial random variable normalized by m with expectation
and variance given by
E
[
TX̂m,Ŷm(x, y)
∣∣TX˜m,Y˜m] = (ATX˜m,Y˜m)[x, y],
Var
[
TX̂m,Ŷm(x, y)
∣∣TX˜m,Y˜m] =
1
m
∑
(x′,y′)∈X×Y
TX˜m,Y˜m(x
′, y′)A[(x, y), (x′, y′)](1−A[(x, y), (x′, y′)]).
8We can bound the following conditional expectation using
Jensen’s inequality to yield
E
[∥∥TX̂m,Ŷm −ATX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2∣∣∣TX˜m,Y˜m]
≤
√ ∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
Var
[
TX̂m,Ŷm(x, y)
∣∣∣TX˜m,Y˜m]
=
[
1
m
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
∑
(x′,y′)∈X×Y
TX˜m,Y˜m(x
′, y′)
A[(x, y), (x′, y′)]
(
1−A[(x, y), (x′, y′)])]1/2
≤
[
1
m
∑
(x′,y′)∈X×Y
TX˜m,Y˜m(x
′, y′)
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
A[(x, y), (x′, y′)]
]1/2
=
1√
m
.
Combining equations yields the bound
E
[∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2∣∣∣TX˜m,Y˜m]
≤ c√
m
‖TX˜m,Y˜m‖2
‖ATX˜m,Y˜m‖2
≤ c√
m
√|X ||Y|‖TX˜m,Y˜m‖1
‖ATX˜m,Y˜m‖1
(4)
= c
√
|X ||Y|
m
,
which, upon applying the smoothing theorem, yields the
following bound on the PRAM error
E
[∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2]
= ET
X˜m,Y˜ m
[
E
[∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TX˜m,Y˜m∥∥2∣∣∣TX˜m,Y˜m]]
≤ c
√
|X ||Y|
m
.
Combining the individual bounds on the sampling and
PRAM error via the triangle inequality yields the following
bound on expected norm-2 error of the type estimate formed
from the sampled and perturbed data,
E
∥∥A−1TX̂m,Ŷm − TXn,Y n∥∥2 ≤ c
√|X ||Y|+ 1√
m
.
Since A is a γ-diagonal matrix, its condition number c is
given by
c = 1 +
|X ||Y|
γ − 1 .
Given a fixed PRAM perturbation parameter γ, the error
bound decays on the order of O(1/
√
m) as a function of
the sampling parameter m. However, as m increases,  as
given in Equation (1) also grows, decreasing privacy. However,
when we fix the overall privacy level , by adjusting γ as a
function of m, as given by Equation (2), in order to maintain
the desired level of privacy, we observe that increasing m
too much will cause the error bound to expand. Intuitively,
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Fig. 4. Authorized researchers apply decryption keys Vm and Wm from
Alice and Bob to decrypt the message and obtain the perturbed samples. They
then use the inverse of the PRAM matrix to estimate the true type.
this can be explained as by having m too large, we need
to increase the PRAM perturbation through lowering γ to
maintain the same level of privacy, which has the adverse
effect of increasing the error bound through the condition
number c. On the other hand, by having m too small, too few
samples are taken resulting in an inaccurate type estimate.
This balance in adjusting the sampling parameter m shows
that there is an optimal sample size m as a function of the
desired level of privacy  and other system parameters. The
theoretically optimal sample size m for the error upper bound
is given by the following corollary.
Corollary 3.6: The optimal sampling parameter m∗ that
optimizes the error bound of Equation (3) is
m∗ =
n
(
1 +
√|X ||Y|) (e − 1)
(|X ||Y|) 32 . (5)
Proof: By combining equations for the expected error
bound, Equation (3), and the required level of γ, Equation (2),
we have
c
√|X ||Y|+ 1√
m
=
(
1 + |X ||Y|γ−1
)√|X ||Y|+ 1
√
m
=
1 +
√|X ||Y|√
m
+
(|X ||Y|) 32√
m(γ − 1)
=
1 +
√|X ||Y|√
m
+
(|X ||Y|) 32√m
n(e − 1) .
By setting the derivative of this expression to zero, we can
solve to find the optimal m,(
1 +
√
|X ||Y|
)(−m− 32
2
)
+
(|X ||Y|) 32
n(e − 1)
(
m−
1
2
2
)
= 0
⇐⇒ m∗ =
n
(
1 +
√|X ||Y|) (e − 1)
(|X ||Y|) 32 . (6)
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to validate our theoretical results, we conducted
experiments that simulated our proposed system using the UCI
“Adult Data Set” [14] and synthetically generated data. The
UCI “Adult Data Set” was extracted from the 1994 Census
database and consists of personal information for over 48
thousand individuals, with various attributes including age,
education, marital status, occupation, gender, race, income,
etc.
For the first set of experiments, we reduced the cardinality of
the attribute set by considering only a subset of the attributes as
9well as quantizing some attributes into categories. Specifically,
we used education (quantized to “no college”, “some col-
lege”, or “post-graduate degree”), marital status (quantized to
“married” or “single/divorced/widowed”), gender (inherently
categorized as “male” or “female”), and salary (inherently
categorized as “over 50K” or “50K or less”), resulting in a total
attribute set cardinality of |X ||Y| = 24. We also discarded
any individuals where there was missing information in any
of these attributes, reducing the size of the total dataset to
45222 individuals. In this and the remaining experiments,
while varying the sampling parameter m and overall privacy
level , we set the level of PRAM perturbation γ as dictated
by Equation (2). The results of the simulations with the UCI
“Adult Data Set” are presented in Figure 5. The data points
show the simulation results, with each point being an empirical
estimate over 1000 independent experiments of the expected
`2-norm of the type error. The simulations were conducted for
three privacy levels  = 0.1, 0.5 and 1.0, and over a wide range
of sampling parameters m at each level. The corresponding
theoretical utility bounds (see Equation (3) of Theorem 3.4)
are illustrated by the solid curves, and the optimal number of
samples (see Equation (5)) are shown with the vertical lines.
We make the following observations: Firstly, we observe
that the theoretical prediction of the optimal number of sam-
ples aligns well with the experimental results. In other words,
the optimal sampling factor computed using the theoretical
bounds is nearly identical to that obtained via experiment,
for all privacy levels. Secondly, we find that the shape of
the theoretical bounds is very similar to the shape formed
by the experimental results, however the theoretical bounds
are off by about a factor of
√|X ||Y|. To verify this, note
that the shape of these bounds, when divided by a factor of√|X ||Y| and plotted with the dashed lines aligns well with
the experimental results. We confirmed that this behavior is
reproduced even when we change the cardinality of the data.
We observed this behavior over various cardinalities ranging
from 12 to 768, with 1000 independent experiments conducted
at each cardinality.
The looseness of the theoretical bounds can perhaps be
explained by the bounding technique used in Equation (4) on
the ratio of `2-norms,
‖TX˜m,Y˜m‖2
‖ATX˜m,Y˜m‖2
≤
√|X ||Y|‖TX˜m,Y˜m‖1
‖ATX˜m,Y˜m‖1
=
√
|X ||Y|,
which introduces a pessimistic factor of
√|X ||Y| when
bounding with the ratio of `1-norms. This pessimistic bound is
approached only if ‖TX˜m,Y˜m‖2 is close to 1 (or, equivalently,
TX˜m,Y˜m is close to a delta function) and ‖ATX˜m,Y˜m‖2 is
close to 1/
√|X ||Y| (or, equivalently, ATX˜m,Y˜m is close to
uniform). Note that, while the gap can be made arbitrarily
small, the bound cannot be met with exact equality due to
the γ-diagonal structure of A with γ > 1. However, when the
type of the data TX˜m,Y˜m is (or close to) uniform, the bound
is loose as the ratio of `2-norms is equal (or close) to one. In
our experiments, we have seen that the results with uniformly
distributed synthetic data closely matches those with the real
data, and appears to either match or bound the utility results
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Decrypt with
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Estimate via inverse
of PRAM matrix
Figure 4: Authorized researchers apply decryption keys V and
W from Alice and Bob to decrypt the message and obtain the
perturbed samples. They then use inverse of PRAM matrix to
estimate the true type.
In order to validate our theoretical results, we conducted exper-
iments that simulated our proposed system using the UCI “Adult
Data Set” [?] and synthetically generated data. The UCI “Adult
Data Set” was extracted from the 1994 Census database and con-
sists of personal information for over 48 thousand individuals, with
various attributes including age, education, marital status, occupa-
tion, gender, race, income, etc. For our experiments, we reduced
the cardinality of the attribute set by considering o ly subset of
the attributes as well as quantizing some attributes into categories.
Specifically, we used education (quantized to “no co lege”, “some
college”, or “post-graduate degree”), marital status (quantized to
“married” or “single/divorced/widowed”), gen er (inh rently cate-
gorized as “male” or “female”), and salary (inherently categorized
as “over 50K” or “50K or less”), resulting in a total attribute set
cardinality of |X ||Y| = 24. We also discarded any individuals
where there was missing information in any of these attributes, re-
ducing the size of the total dataset to only 45222 individ als. In our
experiments, while varying the sampling parameter m and overall
privacy level ✏, we set the level of PRAM perturbation   as dictated
by Equation (2).
The results of the simulations with the UCI “Adult Data Set”
are presented in Figure 5. The data point how he simulation
results, with each point being an empirical estimate (over 1000 in-
dependent experiments) of the expected L2-norm of th type er-
ror. The simulations were conducted for three privacy levels ✏ and
over a wide range of sampling parameters m at each level. The
corresponding theoretical utility bounds (se Equati (3) of Theo-
rem 3.4) are illustrated by the solid curves, and the optimal number
of samples (see Equation (4)) are shown with t e vertical li es. We
see that the theoretical predictions of the optimal number of sam-
ples seems to align well with the experimental results. Despite t e
bounds being off by over a factor of
p|X ||Y|, the shape of these
bounds, when examined by dividing by factor of
p|X ||Y| (as
plotted with the dashed lines), seems to match well with the exper-
imental results. This behavior is also observed in experiments with
cardinality ranging from 12 to 768.
In our simulations with synthetically generated data, we gener-
ated synthetic datasets of the same length (n = 45222) and at-
tribute cardinality (|X ||Y| = 24) but with three different distri-
bution shapes, “uniform”, “linear”, and “peak”. The “uniform”
dataset is simply uniformly distributed over the attribute set. The
“linear” dataset has a type function that linearly increases from c for
the least frequent attribute to 24c for the most frequent attribute,
where c := (1 + . . . + 24) 1 is a normalizing constant. In the
“peak” dataset, the most frequent attribute domina es the distribu-
tion at 90 percent, while the other attributes uniformly share the re-
maining 10 percent of the distribution m ss. The experiments with
the “uniform” and “linear” synthetic datasets produced results that
were very similar to those with the UCI dataset. These results are
plotted alongside the UCI dataset results in Figures 6 and 7, respec-
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Figure 5: The experimental results from simulations with the
UCI dataset are plotted as points alongside the theoretical re-
sults. The experiments were conducted for three privacy levels
(✏) and across a range of number of samples (m). Each data
point represents the expected L2-norm of the type error esti-
mated as the empirical mean over 1000 independent experi-
m nts. The solid curves illustrate the theoretical error bound,
and the solid vertical lines illustrate theoretically optimal num-
ber of samples at each privacy level. The dashed lines corre-
spond to the error bound divided by a factor of
p|X ||Y| to
illustrate that the bounds seem to capture the correct shape,
albeit being loose by a multiplicative factor.
Fig. 5. The experimental results from simulations with the UCI dataset
are plotted as points alongside the theoretical results. The experiments were
conducted for three privacy levels () and across a range of number of samples
(m). Each data point represents the expected `2-norm of the type error
estimated as the empirical mean over 1000 independent experiments. The
solid curves illustrate the theoretical error bound, and the solid vertical lines
illustrate theoretically optimal number of samples at each privacy level. The
dashed lines correspond to the error bound divided by a factor of
√|X ||Y|
to illustrate that the bounds seem to capture the correct shape, albeit being
loose by a multiplicative factor.
for the other synthetic distributions. If we tighten this bound
by replacing the ratio of `2-norms with one (assuming that this
is a reasonable bounding approximation), the utility bound of
Equation (3) becomes
E
∥∥T̂Xn,Y n − TXn,Y n∥∥2 ≤ c+ 1√m ,
which reduces the overall error bound by roughly a factor of√|X ||Y|, since the condition number c typically dominates
over one.
Next, we conducted simulations with synthetically gener-
ated data. We generated synthetic datasets of the same length
as the UCI dataset (n = 45222) and cardinality (|X ||Y| = 24),
but with three different distribution shapes, “uniform”, “lin-
ear”, and “peaky”. The “uniform” dataset is simply uniformly
distributed over the attribute set. The “linear” dataset has a type
function that linearly increases from (1/q) for the least fre-
quent attribute to (24/q) for the most frequent attribute, where
q := (1 + . . .+ 24) is a normalizing constant. In the “peaky”
dataset, the most frequent attribute dominates the distribution
at 90 percent, while the other attributes uniformly share the
remaining 10 percent of the distribution mass. The experiments
with the “uniform” and “linear” synthetic datasets produced
results that were very similar to those with the UCI dataset.
These results are plotted alongside the UCI dataset results in
Figures 6 and 7, respectively. However, the experiments with
the “peaky” synthetic dataset, presented in Figure 8, produced
markedly different results than the UCI dataset experiments
for lower values of m. We confirmed that this behavior is
reproduced in experiments when the cardinality of the dataset
is varied from 12 to 768. We conjecture that this is due to
the high skewedness of the “peaky” synthetic dataset, which
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Fig. 6. The experimental results from simulations with the UCI dataset
are plotted alongside the results from simulations with synthetic data with
a “uniform” distribution. The vertical lines illustrate theoretically optimal
number of samples at each privacy level. Each data point for both datasets
was produced from 1000 independent experiments.
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Fig. 7. The experimental results from simulations with the UCI dataset
are plotted alongside the results from simulations with synthetic data with a
“linear” distribution. The vertical lines illustrate theoretically optimal number
of samples at each privacy level. Each data point for both datasets was
produced from 1000 independent experiments.
effectively reduces the impact of the cardinality of the dataset
resulting in decreased error for lower values of m, the number
of samples.
Our experiments confirm that using the optimal number
of samples (m∗) derived from theoretical bound in Equa-
tion (6) consistently achieves near the minimum error in our
experiments. This is observed in all experiments with differ-
ential cardinalities, different data distributions and different
privacy levels. We plot the `2-norm error in the estimated
joint distribution for the optimal number of samples m∗ in
Figure 9 for real and synthetic data experiments, at all three
levels of privacy. The error curve of the UCI dataset overlaps
with the error curve of the “linear” distribution and the error
curve of the “uniform” distribution. The error of the “peaky”
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Fig. 8. The experimental results from simulations with the UCI dataset
are plotted alongside the results from simulations with synthetic data with a
“peak” distribution. The vertical lines illustrate theoretically optimal number
of samples at each privacy level. Each data point for both datasets was
produced from 1000 independent experiments.
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Fig. 9. The experimental results from simulations with the UCI dataset
are plotted alongside the results from simulations with synthetic data. The
number of samples for each pair of cardinality and privacy level is computed
by Equation (6). Each data point for both datasets was produced from 1000
independent experiments.
distribution is consistently lower than other distributions. As
mentioned above, we conjecture that this is due to the high
skewedness of this synthetic dataset which effectively reduced
the impact of the cardinality on the utility measure.
V. DISCUSSION
We conclude our paper with a brief discussion to summarize
our results and outline practical considerations toward imple-
menting our proposed system.
A. Summary of Results
We analyzed a proposed system that combines sampling
with PRAM to produce a privacy-preserving mechanism that
enables data release for statistical analysis. The sampling stage
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has two benefits in the system: 1) it enhances the system
privacy improving the privacy-utility tradeoff, 2) it reduces the
costs of one-time-pad encryption that provides strong security
against a facilitating server. Sampling reduces the amount of
PRAM noise needed to provide a desired level of privacy, but
oversampling will actually degrade the estimation performance
since too much noise is required to maintain privacy. However,
undersampling will also degrade estimation performance since
less data is gathered. In this balance, there is an optimal
sampling parameter, which we found in our analysis and
confirmed in experiments with real and synthetic data.
B. Practical Considerations
The privacy-preserving framework described in this work is
easy to implement in practice with very small modifications to
the abstract setting of this paper. For instance, in the problem
setting discussed above, encryption was accomplished by
means of a one-time-pad which is an information-theoretic ab-
straction. Actually using one-time-pads may be feasible if the
sampling parameter is small enough to allow key distribution
at a reasonable cost. However, a practical alternative would be
to perform encryption with a conventional stream cipher, with
the key provided to the curators and the authorized researcher
but not to the server. From the perspective of the authorized
researcher and the database respondents, the privacy-utility
tradeoff remains the same. The only change is that, the data
released by the curators has computational privacy instead
of information theoretic privacy against the server. In other
words, a computationally bounded server cannot recover the
data sampled by the curators.
Furthermore, several interesting variants of the proposed
framework are possible owing to the fact that sampling, en-
cryption and PRAM-based perturbation can commute without
changing the privacy-utility tradeoff. The ordering of these
operations is flexible allowing other architectures with the
parties performing different roles. For instance, if the curators
want a secure external database storage facility, then they could
encrypt the full database with a stream cipher, and request that
the server perform both sampling and PRAM.
An important practical issue that has not been addressed
in this work is the synchronization of the curators’ databases
and the sampling phase. In our development, it is assumed
that the respondents in Alice’s and Bob’s database are already
synchronized and that they are able to sample in the same
locations. A practical approach toward database synchroniza-
tion could involve using secure hashes of the unique IDs
associated with each record, if available. Synchronization of
the sampling locations could be accomplished by either the
curators directly sharing the sampling indices (using no more
than m log n bits of communication) or by sharing the seed of
a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator,
that drives the choice of the sampling locations. In the latter
approach, the use of pseudorandomness would affect the
statistical privacy guarantees against the researcher, however
the practical impact would likely be insignificant against a
computationally bounded researcher. If the application allows
for flexible architectures as described earlier, another alterna-
tive would be to have the sampling performed by the server.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Samarati, “Protecting respondents’ identities in microdata release,”
IEEE Trans. on Knowl. and Data Eng., vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 1010–1027,
Nov. 2001.
[2] P. Samarati and L. Sweeney, “Protecting privacy when disclosing in-
formation: k-anonymity and its enforcement through generalization and
suppression,” CMU, SRI, Tech. Rep., 1998.
[3] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “De-anonymizing social networks,” in
Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
ser. SP ’09. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2009,
pp. 173–187.
[4] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy: a survey of results,” in Proceedings of
the 5th international conference on Theory and applications of models
of computation, ser. TAMC’08. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag,
2008, pp. 1–19.
[5] C. Dwork and A. Smith, “Differential privacy for statistics: What we
know and what we want to learn,” Journal of Privacy and Confidential-
ity, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009.
[6] S. P. Kasiviswanathan, H. K. Lee, K. Nissim, S. Raskhodnikova, and
A. Smith, “What can we learn privately?” in Foundations of Computer
Science, IEEE Annual Symposium on. Los Alamitos, CA, USA: IEEE
Computer Society, 2008, pp. 531–540.
[7] K. Chaudhuri, C. Monteleoni, and A. Sarwate, “Differentially pri-
vate empirical risk minimization,” in J. Mach. Learn. Res., vol. 12.
JMLR.org, jul 2011, pp. 1069–1109.
[8] S. L. Warner, “Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminating
evasive answer bias,” Journal of the American Statistical Association,
vol. 60, no. 309, Mar. 1965.
[9] ——, “The linear randomized response model.” Journal of American
Statistical Association, vol. 66, no. 336, pp. 884–888, Dec. 1971.
[10] J. Gouweleeuw, P. Kooiman, L. Willenborg, and P.-P. de Wolf, “Post
randomisation for statistical disclosure control: Theory and implemen-
tation,” Journal of Official Statistics, vol. 14, no. 4, 1998.
[11] A. Smith, “Differential privacy and the secrecy of the sample,
http://adamdsmith.wordpress.com/2009/09/02/sample-secrecy/.”
[12] N. Li, W. Qardaji, and D. Su, “On sampling, anonymization, and
differential privacy: Or, k-anonymization meets differential privacy,”
http://arxiv.org/abs/1101.2604, 2011.
[13] J. Gehrke, M. Hay, E. Lui, and R. Pass, “ Crowd-Blending Privacy ,”
in Proceedings of the 32nd International Cryptology Conference, 2012.
[14] A. Frank and A. Asuncion, “UCI machine learning repository,” 2010.
[Online]. Available: http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml
[15] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy,” in International Colloquium on Au-
tomata, Languages and Programming, 2006, pp. 1–12.
[16] D. Kifer and B.-R. Lin, “Towards an axiomatization of statistical privacy
and utility,” in Proceedings of the twenty-ninth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-
SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems, ser. PODS ’10.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2010, pp. 147–158.
[17] ——, “An axiomatic view of statistical privacy and utility,” To appear
in Journal of Privacy and Confidentiality.
[18] D. Kifer and A. Machanavajjhala, “No free lunch in data privacy,” in
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on
Management of data, ser. SIGMOD ’11. New York, NY, USA: ACM,
2011, pp. 193–204.
